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Abstract 
Labour market policies for the unemployed combine passive income support with active 
measures that aim at improving jobseekers' employment prospects. This paper extends the 
theoretical framework developed by Pavoni and Violante (2005a) for the optimal choice 
between different active and passive policies for the unemployed to a setting which allows 
for the use of a job search assistance programme that affects the exit rate to employment by 
raising search effectiveness but not productivity in the job. These programmes are one of 
the most widely used activation measures in OECD countries and should, therefore, be 
taken into account when considering the optimal design of labour market policies. The 
enriched model allows to answer a wide range of interesting policy questions. It is used to 
assess the optimality of the West German policy in the period 2000-2002 as well as the 
benefits from introducing tight monitoring. It is shown that sizeable budget savings could 
have been realised by switching to the optimal scheme, but that the net gains from 
monitoring are only small. In addition, some interesting results on the optimal use of job 
search assistance and training are derived. It is shown that existing policies already share 
some but not all features of the optimal scheme. 
Keywords 
Unemployment insurance, active labour market policies, recursive contracts, job search, 
human capital 
JEL Classification 
D82, J24, J64, J68 1 Introduction
In most countries labour market policies for the unemployed rely on two sets of instruments.
On the one hand, income support during unemployment provides consumption insurance and
gives jobseekers the opportunity to look for an appropriate job (so-called passive measures). On
the other hand, so-called active labour market policies (ALMPs) aim at improving jobseekers'
employment prospects, e.g. by increasing search e®ectiveness or skills. Expenditures on such
policies are substantial, ranging from 1% to 5% of GDP in OECD countries (OECD, 2007).
Traditionally, passive and active measures for the unemployed have been treated separately
in the literature. Starting with the seminal work of Shavell and Weiss (1979), there is a large
literature on the optimal design of unemployment insurance payments. Here, the main issue is
how to provide consumption insurance while ensuring that jobseekers provide an appropriate
level of search e®ort, which is usually unobserved by the insurer. Di®erent aspects of this question
have been analysed such as the joint optimisation of bene¯ts and employment taxes, both with
and without repeated unemployment experience (Hopenhayn and Nicolini, 1997, 2005), or the
impact of human capital depreciation during unemployment (Pavoni, 2003), among many others.
In contrast, the question of the optimal design of ALMPs, i.e. their optimal duration, timing
within the unemployment spell and allocation to jobseekers, has been addressed only relatively
recently. So far, the main interest of this literature is in ¯nding the optimal (social welfare
maximising) assignment mechanism for jobseekers to di®erent programmes (e.g. Manski, 2000,
2001, 2002, 2004, 2005; Dehejia, 2005; Hirano and Porter, 2006). One part of this still rather
small literature is empirical and tries to ¯nd the most e®ective programme for each individual on
the basis of estimates of individual treatment response from historical data (e.g. FrÄ olich, Lechner,
and Steiger, 2003; Lechner and Smith, 2007; FrÄ olich, 2007). A ¯rst attempt to empirically address
timing issues has been made recently by Lechner and Wiehler (2007).
Yet, there are obviously important interactions between providing search incentives through
unemployment insurance, and active measures. On the one hand, ALMPs try to increase exit
rates to employment, e.g. by improving search e®ectiveness or skills, in order to reduce un-
employment insurance payments. If successful, this would also ease the provision of search
1incentives because the returns to search are increased. On the other hand, these programmes
are costly and participation reduces the time available for active job search. Empirical studies
for di®erent countries show that these so-called lock-in e®ects can be substantial depending on
programme duration (e.g. van Ours, 2004; Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch, 2006; Sianesi, 2004).
So far, there has been only one attempt to jointly optimise search incentives, unemployment
insurance payments and the use of ALMPs. Pavoni and Violante (2005a, 2006) develop a
theoretical framework for analysing the optimal choice between di®erent active and passive
policy instruments during the unemployment spell. In their model, workers di®er with respect
to human capital, which a®ects both the job ¯nding rate and wages and which depreciates
during unemployment. Pavoni and Violante (2005a) consider four policies: unmonitored search,
job search monitoring, training which increases human capital, and social assistance.1 The latter
does not require job search. They derive the optimal path of bene¯ts during unemployment and
income taxes once employed under each policy, as well as the optimal sequence of policies over
the unemployment spell. They show that human capital dynamics are necessary for policy
transitions to occur. Moreover, in the absence of training, the typical sequence of policies would
be unemployment insurance with unmonitored search followed by monitored search and then
social assistance, which is shown to be an absorbing policy of \last resort". Optimal bene¯ts
turn out to be generally decreasing or constant during unemployment, but must increase after
a successful spell of training in order to incentivise the worker to provide positive e®ort. As
an illustration, they calibrate the model to the U.S. labour market and show that the optimal
welfare-to-work scheme would yield sizeable welfare gains compared with the current system.
One important drawback of the model by Pavoni and Violante (2005a, 2006) is that it does
not allow for active policies that a®ect the job ¯nding rate but not productivity in the job.
The most prominent example of such a policy are job search assistance programmes, which
are one of the most widely used activation measures in OECD countries (OECD, 2007). They
aim at increasing individual job ¯nding rates by raising search e®ectiveness. The objective is
to help those unemployed without any severe skill de¯cits to ¯nd a job as quickly as possible,
1 Pavoni and Violante (2006) is a condensed version of Pavoni and Violante (2005a) where training is not
considered.
2e.g. by teaching them how to locate job vacancies and how to formulate a job application, or
by simulating and practising job interviews. The programmes are usually short and, hence,
relatively inexpensive. Moreover, they have proven to be quite e®ective in many countries (e.g.
Fay, 1996; Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith, 1999; Martin and Grubb, 2001; Kluve and Schmidt,
2002) which explains their popularity and importance.
This paper tries to overcome this drawback by extending the theoretical framework of Pavoni
and Violante (2005a) to a setting which allows for the use of a job-search-assistance technology
that can raise search e®ectiveness, which is introduced as an additional state variable, hereby
increasing the exit rate to employment but not productivity in the job because the latter only
depends on human capital.
The theoretical results that can be derived from the enriched model con¯rm that the presence
of the information asymmetry with respect to the worker's e®ort requires bene¯ts to increase
upon success of his activity and to fall upon failure in order to incentivise the worker, thus
underlining the generality of this result ¯rst derived by Shavell and Weiss (1979). It is shown
that social assistance remains an optimal policy of last resort. Furthermore, it is con¯rmed that
it is never optimal to switch from monitored to unmonitored search. However, human capital
dynamics are no longer necessary for policy transitions to occur because of the dynamics implied
by search e®ectiveness as additional state variable.
To derive more detailed insights on the optimal sequence of policies the model is calibrated to
the West German economy in the period 2000-2002. West Germany is an interesting case because
it is comparable to most industrialised OECD countries. Moreover, in the course of substantial
reforms of the German unemployment insurance system there have been heated debates on its
optimal design in recent years. Finally, the availability of exceptionally rich administrative data
allows most parameters of the model to be estimated nonparametrically from the same data and
for the same sample, which is a large improvement compared to most existing calibrations of
economic models.
The calibrated model is used to assess the optimality of the West German policy in the period
2000-2002 and to compare the features of the optimal scheme with the recent reforms of the
3German system. It turns out that about 32% or 28 billion EUR of government expenditures
could have been saved by switching to the optimal scheme. Moreover, the optimal duration of
an unemployment insurance claim and the optimal level of social assistance for a worker with
median characteristics are strikingly close to what has been introduced recently in Germany.
The simulation is also used to assess whether a currently unavailable tight monitoring tech-
nology would be bene¯cial and worth introducing in West Germany. It is found that it would be
optimal to use monitoring for almost all levels of human capital and even when monitoring costs
are high. Moreover, the optimal timing and duration of monitoring within the unemployment
spell depends on the worker's search e®ectiveness. Thus, there is an important role for search
e®ectiveness in the model even in the absence of a job-search-assistance technology. However,
the net gains from monitoring are too small to justify its introduction.
Another salient feature of the simulation is that by varying the parameters of the job-search-
assistance and training technologies it is possible to obtain more general insights on their optimal
use. It is found that existing ALMPs already share some but not all features of the optimal
scheme. In line with existing ALMPs it is shown that participation prolongs the period for
which unemployment insurance payments rather than social assistance are optimal. Moreover,
for job search assistance (JA) it is usually optimal to use it at the beginning of unemployment
as well as after depreciation of search e®ectiveness following the successful use of JA later in
the unemployment spell. Furthermore, the optimal duration of JA is usually short. However, it
is shown that the accumulation rate of search e®ectiveness must exceed 3% per half-month in
order for JA to be used at all.
For training (TR) it turns out that a wage accumulation rate of at least 1.8% per half-month
is necessary for TR to be used at all, which means that the e®ect of TR must be relatively
large. Then, it is optimal to use TR for a range of intermediate values of human capital, which
increases the larger the e®ect of TR. The optimal duration of TR can be long for intermediate
accumulation rates while it should be relatively short otherwise. Because TR a®ects both the
job ¯nding rate and wages, it usually dominates JA. However, if JA is su±ciently e®ective, it is
optimal to use TR only after a short period of JA at the beginning of the unemployment spell.
4The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section describes the details of
the model. In Section 3 the basic mechanisms of the model are discussed and the theoretical
results on the optimal bene¯t scheme and sequence of policies are derived. In Section 4 the
model is calibrated to the West German economy in the period 2000-2002. The optimal bene¯t
scheme and sequence of policies is derived and the optimal use of job search monitoring, job
search assistance and training is discussed in detail. A sensitivity analysis complements this
section. The last section concludes. An appendix contains the main proofs of the theoretical
results as well as further details on the calibration. Additional proofs as well as descriptive
statistics of the data are provided in a supplementary technical appendix (Wunsch, 2007).
2 The model
2.1 The baseline setup
The baseline economy considered by Pavoni and Violante (2005a) is characterised by in¯nitely
lived workers who have time-separable preferences over consumption c ¸ 0 and e®ort a. The
latter is either high (a = e > 0) or low (a = 0), which underlines the role of ¯xed costs and the
extensive margin of participation decisions. Agents discount the future at rate ¯ 2 (0;1), and
period utility is given by u(ct)¡at, where u(¢) is strictly increasing, strictly concave and smooth
with limc!1 u0(c) = 0. Moreover, the ¯rst derivative of u¡1 is assumed to be convex.2
Workers can either be employed (z = ze) or unemployed (z = zu). They di®er in their human-
capital or skill endowment h, which may accumulate during employment or after a successful
spell of training and depreciates at rate ±h during unemployment without training or if training
fails.3 Human capital evolves according to
hs = g(h); g0(h) > 0; g00(h) · 0; (1)
hf = (1 ¡ ±h)h; (2)
2 As Pavoni and Violante (2005a, 2006) argue, a wide range of utility functions, including the CARA class and
a large part of the CRRA class, satis¯es this condition.
3 In the revised and condensed version of Pavoni and Violante (2005a), the authors abstract from the accumu-
lation of human capital and training (Pavoni and Violante, 2006).
5where the superscripts s are used for success and f for failure of the worker's search or training
activity. Pavoni and Violante (2005a) assume that g(h) = Ah® + (1 ¡ ±h)h; ® 2 [0;1]; A ¸ 0.
Here, no additional assumptions are made with respect to the function g(¢).
During employment a worker of type h produces output w(h) 2 [0;wmax] with w(0) = 0
and w(¢) being a continuous and increasing function. Following Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997)
employment is assumed to be absorbing in order to concentrate on the (current) unemployment
experience.4 The disutility of e®ort during employment is generally not restricted to be the same
as during search or any of the active labour market programmes. However, it must be ensured
that accepting a job o®er always dominates staying unemployed.5 Human capital is assumed to
accumulate at no cost (learning by doing) to ensure that employment remains dominant.
During unemployment, human capital h can be raised by use of a training technology at
cost ·TR > 0. Traditionally, it is argued that this increases productivity in a job, hereby
increasing the number of jobs a worker quali¯es for and potential wages upon reemployment
(e.g. Mortensen, 1970). This, in turn, should raise the job ¯nding probability and the value of
employment, thus, increasing the returns to search. In the model, training is successful with
probability µTR(a), which is only positive if e®ort is also positive, i.e. µTR(e) > µTR(0) = 0.6 In
this case, human capital accumulates according to (1).
For simpli¯cation it is assumed that workers do not have access to storage, insurance or credit
markets. In particular, it is assumed that workers cannot self-insure against the random outcome
y 2 fs;fg of their search or training activity, e.g. by saving. Pavoni and Violante (2005a) show
that when workers can save through credit markets but still face a no-borrowing constraint,
which is a reasonable assumption for unemployed workers, the same optimal contract can be
implemented by introducing a linear, time-invariant interest tax.
4 Qualitative results for the same unemployment spell do not change as long as the job separation rate is
exogenous. Optimal contracts with endogenous job separation are studied by Zhao (2000) and Hopenhayn
and Nicolini (2005) who show that in this case the optimal contract has to take into account the worker's full
employment history.
5 For example, assuming that e®ort is the same during employment and search would imply that the worker
searches for a job with the same intensity and time input as he works.
6 This incorporates the idea that the (expected) e®ect of training is increasing in training e®ort.
6The basic contractual relationships are as follows. There is a risk-neutral planner who o®ers
a risk-averse agent, the unemployed worker, an insurance contract at time t = 0. This contract
maximises expected discounted (at rate ¯) net ¯scal revenues,7 subject to providing the agent
with at least an expected discounted utility level of U0. The latter is exogenously given, e.g. the
outcome of voting, and can be regarded as a measure of the generosity of the welfare system.
The planner can observe the worker's employment status z 2 fzu;zeg, his activity (search or
programme participation) and the outcome y 2 fs;fg of this activity. But he cannot observe
the worker's e®ort choice a, so that he faces a moral hazard problem. However, there is a
monitoring technology available where, upon payment of a cost ·JM > 0, the planner can
observe the worker's search e®ort during job search.8
The contract speci¯es, for each period t and contingent on all observable histories up to t,
the transfers to the worker, the policy option to be used and the corresponding recommended
e®ort choice of the worker. With the exception of monitored search where there is no informa-
tional asymmetry anymore, all recommendations of high e®ort must be incentive compatible.
Moreover, Pavoni and Violante (2005a) allow the planner to specify the contract contingent on
the observable realisation xt 2 [0;1] of a uniform random variable Xt. This randomisation is
a device to convexify the planner's problem (see also Phelan and Stacchetti, 2001; Phelan and
Townsend, 1991, as well as the technical appendix).
2.2 Extensions of the baseline model
One important limitation of the model by Pavoni and Violante (2005a) is that it only allows
for active policies that a®ect both the job ¯nding rate and productivity in the job. Although
this covers both formal training and programmes that provide work experience, it excludes
job-search-assistance programmes as one of the most widely used activation measure for the
unemployed in OECD countries (OECD, 2007). These programmes aim at increasing individual
job ¯nding rates by raising search e®ectiveness without a®ecting productivity in the job. The
7 In other words, the planner minimises expected discounted net expenditure of the unemployment insurance
system.
8 The planner may, for example, pay a caseworker who monitors closely the workers search activities. Such
technology is, however, unavailable during programme participation because the worker's learning e®ort, in
particular his attention and concentration, are very hard to verify.
7objective is to help those unemployed without any severe skill de¯cits to ¯nd a job as quickly
as possible, e.g. by teaching them how to locate job vacancies and how to formulate a job
application, or by simulating and practising job interviews. Usually, these programmes are
short and, thus, less costly than traditional training or wage subsidies. This, together with the
fact that they have proven to be quite e®ective in many countries (e.g. Fay, 1996; Heckman,
LaLonde, and Smith, 1999; Martin and Grubb, 2001; Kluve and Schmidt, 2002), explains the
popularity and importance of job-search-assistance programmes. Therefore, these programmes
should be taken into account when considering the optimal design of labour market policies.
For this reason, the economy considered by Pavoni and Violante (2005a) is enriched by in-
troducing search e®ectiveness as another source of worker heterogeneity. It is assumed that the
worker is endowed with an initial level of search e®ectiveness ^ p. This level can be raised by use of
a newly introduced job-search-assistance technology at cost ·JA > 0, but the e®ect depreciates
over time. However, in contrast to human capital h it is assumed that search e®ectiveness p can-
not fall below its original level ^ p. Similar to the training technology, the outcome of job search
assistance is stochastic with success probability µJA(a) where µJA(e) > µJA(0) = 0. Depending
on whether job search assistance was successful or failed, the law of motion for p is given by
ps = f(p); f(0) = 0; f0(p) > 0; f00(p) · 0; (3)
pf = maxf^ p;(1 ¡ ±p)pg (4)
with no additional assumptions being made with respect to the function f(¢).
In the enriched setting, the job ¯nding probability of an unemployed worker is not only
a®ected by search e®ort a 2 f0;eg and human capital h, but also by search e®ectiveness p.
The corresponding hazard rate is denoted by ¼(h;p;a) and it is assumed that ¼(h;p;0) ´ 0
and that ¼(h;p;e) ´ ¼(h;p) 2 (0;1) is continuous and increasing in both elements. Note that
the monotonicity of ¼ in h together with human capital depreciation induces negative duration
dependence in ¼, which is an empirically well established fact in labour economics (see e.g. the
survey of the relevant literature by Machin and Manning, 1999).
8In total, there are eight policy options in the enriched economy: unmonitored and monitored
search as well as job search assistance and training, each with high (positive) and low (zero) e®ort
recommendation. However, the planner will never combine monitoring with low e®ort because
any deviation from no search can be observed at no additional cost since ¼(h;p;0) = 0. Moreover,
job search assistance and training will always be combined with high e®ort, because otherwise
the cost of the programme would not be compensated by a return since µJM(0) = µTR(0) = 0.
Thus, there is a set of ¯ve instruments from which the planner will choose: unmonitored search
with positive e®ort (unemployment insurance, UI) or zero e®ort (social assistance, SA), and,
each with positive e®ort, job search monitoring (JM), job search assistance (JA), and training
(TR). In addition, because the insurer can control consumption during employment as well, he
has the opportunity to impose a wage tax or to pay a wage subsidy.
2.3 The planner's problem in the enriched setting
The optimisation problem of the planner is formulated in the recursive form proposed by Pavoni
and Violante (2005a) with two di®erences. First, job search assistance is added to the set of
policies. Second, search e®ectiveness is introduced as another state variable, so that a state
is de¯ned by the promised continuation utility U, the level of human capital h and search
e®ectiveness p, i.e. by the triple (U;h;p).
At the beginning of each period, the planner chooses the optimal policy instrument i(U;h;p)
for an unemployed worker who enters the period with state (U;h;p) by solving
V (U;h;p) = max
i2fJA;JM;SA;UI;TRg
V i(U;h;p) (5)
where V is the upper envelope of the values associated to the di®erent policies which are described















9where the second equation is the promise-keeping constraint which obliges the planner to deliver
continuation utility U to the agent in expected value (with respect to the shock x) terms.
In the following the value functions for employment and each of the ¯ve di®erent policy
instruments are described in detail. In each case, the planner chooses an e®ort recommendation
a(U;h;p) 2 f0;eg, the transfer c(U;h;p) and the continuation utilities Uy(U;h;p) conditional
on the outcome y 2 ff;sg of the agent's activity.
To concentrate on unemployment, employment is assumed to be an absorbing state without
informational asymmetries. For an employed worker and state (U;h;p) the planner solves
W(U;h;p) = max
c;Us w(h) ¡ c + ¯W(Us;hs;pf) (7)
s:t: U = u(c) + ¯Us:
It is easy to show that W is continuous, increasing in h, and decreasing, concave and continuously
di®erentiable in U given the properties of w and u. Moreover, W is independent of p because










with ­(h) = (1 ¡ ¯)w(h) + ¯­(hs) being the discounted stream of wages. Thus, consumption
of the agent will be smoothed fully and promised utility will remain constant over time. The
promise-keeping constraint then implies that the optimal transfer is constant over time and given
by cW(U) = u¡1¡
(1 ¡ ¯)U
¢
. The implicit wage tax (if positive) or subsidy (if negative) that is
imposed on employed workers is, thus, given by ¿(U;h) = w(h) ¡ cW(U) and does not depend
on search e®ectiveness p for obvious reasons.
The planner's problem under the unemployment insurance (UI) scheme is given by
V UI(U;h;p) = max
















U ¸ u(c) + ¯Uf;
10where hf is generated by (2), and W and V are given by (7) and (6), respectively. The ¯rst
constraint is the promise-keeping (PK) constraint and the second one the incentive compatibility
(IC) constraint.
If the planner chooses to monitor the search activities of the agent by using job search moni-
toring (JM), he solves the problem
V JM(U;h;p) = max
















Note the absence of the IC constraint because in this case the planner can observe search e®ort
(against payment of the cost ·JM) so that there is no incentive problem during JM.
If the agent is enrolled in a programme i, which is either training (TR) or job search assistance
(JA), the planner solves
V i(U;h;p) = max
c;Uf;Us ¡c ¡ ·i + ¯
£
µiV(Us;hi;pi) + (1 ¡ µi)V(Uf;hf;pf)
¤
s:t: U = u(c) ¡ e + ¯
£
µiUs + (1 ¡ µi)Uf¤
(11)
U ¸ u(c) + ¯Uf;
where i 2 fJA;TRg and (hTR;pTR) = (hs;pf), and (hJA;pJA) = (hf;ps). It is assumed that
search and programme participation are mutually exclusive activities within a period, implying
that participants in i cannot exit to employment directly from the programme.9 But since the
length of a period can be arbitrarily small, this assumption is not restrictive. With probability
µi, i raises human capital if i = TR, and search e®ectiveness if i = JA, at the cost ·i. Since
positive e®ort is required (a = e > 0), both the PK and the IC constraint are needed.
Under the social assistance (SA) scheme the worker is not required to search (a = 0) but
receives some transfer that ensures delivery of promised utility U. Since e®ort is zero, no IC
9 This corresponds to a so-called lock-in e®ect of programme participation, which has been documented in many
empirical studies (e.g. Ger¯n and Lechner, 2002; van Ours, 2004; Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch, 2006; Sianesi,
2004, 2007; Jespersen, Munch, and Skipper, 2004).
11constraint is needed. The planner's problem is, therefore, given by
V SA(U;h;p) = max
c;Uf;Us ¡c + ¯V(Uf;hf;pf) (12)
s:t: U = u(c) + ¯Uf:
Proposition 0 in the appendix states the properties of the value functions V, W and V i.
In particular, they are continuous functions which are increasing in h and p, and decreasing,
concave and continuously di®erentiable in U.
3 Theoretical results
3.1 Optimal sequence of payments under each policy
Proposition 1 characterises the optimal sequence of bene¯ts under the ¯ve policies and provides
some results on the optimal wage tax/subsidy levied on the worker upon reemployment.
Proposition 1: (i) Bene¯ts are constant during JM and SA. (ii) During UI, JA and TR
bene¯ts are constant if the incentive compatibility constraint does not bind. If it binds, bene¯ts
decrease if the worker's activity fails and increase if it succeeds. (iii) During JM the wage tax
decreases.
The proof in Appendix A shows that results (i) and (ii) are independent of the presence of
human capital and search e®ectiveness as state variables in the model, because they are driven
by the presence or relevance of the IC constraint only. Thus, they are completely general.
Intuitively, under JM and SA there is no incentive problem because under JM search e®ort
can be veri¯ed, and SA releases the worker from any search activity. The same holds if the
IC constraint is not binding during UI, JA and TR. Thus, full insurance with constant bene¯t
payments is provided. In contrast, the necessity to incentivise agents to provide positive e®ort
during UI, JA and TR when the IC constraint binds requires the planner to `punish' the agent
upon failure and to `reward' him upon success of his activity.
Result (iii) follows from wages w(h) decreasing during unemployment because of human capital
depreciation, which implies that the wage tax ¿(U;h) = w(h) ¡ cW(U) decreases during JM.
12In contrast, the behaviour of ¿(U;h) during UI is a quantitative issue because both w(h) and
c(U;h;p) decline. If consumption declines faster than wages, then ¿(U;h) increases. Otherwise
it decreases, or remains constant if both decrease at the same speed.
3.2 Optimal sequence of policies
In the following, both the economic forces at work and the theoretical results on the optimal
sequence of policies that can be derived from the model are discussed.
Whenever positive e®ort e is required - as is the case for all policies except SA - the planner
must compensate the agent for this e®ort (so-called e®ort compensation cost). Since the disutility
of providing e is ¯xed while, because of the concavity of u(¢), the marginal utility of consumption
falls with increasing U, the e®ort compensation in terms of (utility from) transfer payments must
increase with U. Thus, the e®ort compensation cost will be prohibitively large for high levels
of U, making SA most attractive. Since promised utility U does not fall during SA (see below),
SA should remain optimal.
Another case where SA is most attractive is when the depreciation of human capital and
(potentially) search e®ectiveness has reduced the returns to search to a prohibitively low level.
Since human capital depreciates further while search e®ectiveness does not increase during SA,
any policy other than SA becomes even less attractive after one period of SA implying that SA
should remain optimal in this case as well.
Proposition 2: (i) Whenever choosing SA in period t is optimal, it is also optimal thereafter.
(ii) If in some period t the optimal programme is JM, then the next period it is never optimal
to switch to UI if the conditions of Lemma A1 and A2 in Appendix A are satis¯ed. (iii) If f(p)
is strictly concave, JA is not absorbing. (iv) If g(h) is strictly concave, TR is not absorbing.
Proposition 2 (i) shows that SA is always absorbing. As a result and because ¼(h;p;0) = 0, the
equilibrium value of SA does not depend on h and p and is given by ^ V SA(U) = ¡cSA(U)=(1¡¯)




Another important cost component are the incentive costs which arise from having to obey
an IC constraint during JA, UI and TR. Using the PK constraints, the IC constraints in these













which is independent of the transfer c. Since larger di®erences in the utility upon success and
failure of the worker's activity correspond to larger di®erences in the respective consumption
levels, the risk-averse agent has to be compensated with a larger average transfer for a given level
of promised utility U. If the IC constraint is binding, (13) implies that incentive costs remain
constant for JA and TR but increase for UI when h and potentially p fall during unemployment
because ¼(¢) declines in this case.
For i 2 fJM;JA;TRg the are also direct cost ·i which have to be incurred. In case of JA
and TR this adds to the incentive cost, while for JM it replaces the incentive cost that has to
be incurred during UI. The latter implies, that UI should only be used before JM as long as
the incentive cost is lower than the ¯xed cost ·JM. Moreover, since the incentive cost increases
during UI, a switch to JM becomes more likely with increasing unemployment duration. Once
·JM is lower than the incentive cost during UI, a switch back to UI should only occur after
successful use of JA or TR because, otherwise, the incentive cost keeps rising for UI because of
the depreciation of h and potentially p. Result (ii) of Proposition 2 shows that this is indeed
the case under very general conditions.
Whether and if so when in the unemployment spell JA and TR will be used depends on the
returns of these programmes relative to their costs. The former are bounded above because both
the job ¯nding rate and wages are bounded above, making the use of these policies less likely
the higher h and p. Furthermore, Proposition 2 shows that JA (TR) will not be absorbing if the
increase in p (h) upon success of JA (TR) declines with p (h) while the cost of the programme,
·JA (·TR), remains constant, since in this case, the programme will become unpro¯table at some
point after its successful use. Note, moreover, that during both programmes e®ort compensation,
incentive and direct costs have to be incurred. Thus, at least for one period this cost has to be
o®set by the (expected) returns in order for them to be used at all.
14To complete the predictions of the model, it is interesting to see what additional results can be
derived in the absence of human capital dynamics. Pavoni and Violante (2005a, 2006) show that
in the baseline model in this case all policies are absorbing, i.e. that human capital dynamics
are necessary for policy transitions to occur. The results in Proposition 3 imply that this is
generally not the case in the enriched setting.10
Proposition 3: Consider the case where human capital is ¯xed over time. If either p = ^ p
or ±p = 0 the following results hold. (i) If JM is optimal at (U;h;p), JM will always be optimal
thereafter. (ii) If JA is not optimal at (U;h;p) and µJA · ¼(h;p), JA will never be optimal
thereafter. (iii) If UI is optimal at (U;h;p) and µJA · ¼(h;p), UI will always be optimal
thereafter.
Proposition 3, which is proven in Appendix A, implies that if JA is not used in period 0, i.e.
at (U0;h; ^ p), it will never be used if µJA · ¼(h; ^ p). Because of the latter condition this is more
likely the larger h and the original level of search e®ectiveness, ^ p, and the lower the success rate
of JA, µJA. Moreover, in this case the other policies are absorbing. On the other hand, if JM is
optimal in period 0, i.e. at (U0;h; ^ p), then it is used forever even if µJA > ¼(h; ^ p).
However, in all other cases JM and UI are not absorbing because whenever JA is used and
search e®ectiveness changes, either because it accumulates during JA or because it depreciates
after use of JA, the returns to search and the incentive costs during UI change.
4 Simulation for West Germany
In order to derive more detailed insights on the optimal sequence of policies the model is cali-
brated to the West German economy in the period 2000-2002. West Germany is an interesting
case to study because it is comparable to most industrialised OECD countries and, in the course
of substantial reforms of the German unemployment insurance system, there have been heated
debates on its optimal design in recent years. The calibrated model is used to assess the op-
timality of the policy implemented in West Germany in the period 2000-2002 by comparing
it with the optimal scheme that results when the same initial utility ~ U0(h0;p0) is delivered to
10 Note that in this case the optimal choice of policies is driven by the state variables U and p, only. In the
absence of human capital dynamics there is no role for a training programme.
15a worker with characteristics (h0;p0) as implied by the actual system. Second, the potential
bene¯ts of introducing a - currently unavailable - tight monitoring technology in West Germany
are evaluated. Third, to draw some general conclusions on the characteristics and optimal use
of bene¯cial job-search-assistance and training technologies, ranges of parameter values of these
policies for which these programmes are optimally used as well as their optimal duration and
timing within the unemployment spell are identi¯ed.
4.1 Unemployment insurance in West Germany
In Germany, unemployment insurance is mandatory and employees who have contributed for at
least 12 months within the 3 years before entering unemployment are eligible for unemployment
bene¯ts (UB) if they register with the public employment service (PES). The minimum UB
entitlement is 6 months. In the period under consideration, the maximum claim increased
stepwise with total contribution time in the 7 years before becoming unemployed, and age,
up to a maximum of 32 months at age 54 or above with previous contributions of at least 64
months. Since 1994, the replacement rate is 67% of previous average net earnings from insured
employment with dependent children, and 60% without.
Until 2005, unemployed could become eligible for unemployment assistance (UA) after exhaus-
tion of UB. In contrast to UB, UA was means tested and potentially inde¯nite. However, like
UB, UA was proportional to previous earnings but with lower replacement rates than UB (57%
and 53% with and without dependent children, respectively). Unemployed who were ineligible
for UB and UA could receive social assistance, which was a ¯xed monthly payment unrelated
to previous earnings, means-tested and administered by local authorities.
In 2005, one of the largest reforms of German unemployment insurance became e®ective. The
maximum UB entitlement has been cut to 12 and 18 months for unemployed below and above
age 55, respectively. Moreover, UA and social assistance have been combined to a new ¯xed
means-tested welfare payment of normally 345 EUR that is called unemployment bene¯ts II.
Actual payment of bene¯ts is conditional on active job search, regular show-up at the PES, and
participation in labour market programmes. In case of noncompliance with bene¯t conditions
16sanctions, i.e. reductions in or suspensions of bene¯ts, can be imposed. However, search activities
are monitored not very strictly at the moment due to capacity problems within the PES.
Table 1 provides numbers on the use of and expenditures on the most important active and
passive policy measures in West Germany. Given an unemployment rate of about 9% of the
civilian labour force with a relatively large share of long-term unemployed (about 30%) in the
period 2000-2004 (BA, 2001-2005), expenditures on UB and UA are relatively large.
Table 1: Use of alternative policy instruments in West Germany
Entries/recipients in 1000 Expenditure in million EUR
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Job search assistance 286 319 513 690 789 183 196 289 364 312
Training 338 242 259 161 124 4226 4412 3998 3024 2342
Subsidised employment 180 143 158 135 136 1849 1608 1464 1118 765
Support of self-employment 62 65 89 178 249 534 576 768 1271 2045
Unemployment bene¯ts 998 1045 1240 1326 1288 15342 16403 18426 20944 21231
Unemployment assistance 786 761 877 1055 1213 8067 7519 8011 9257 11024
Note: The numbers from 2005 onwards are not comparable due to a complete change in legislation.
Source: BA (2001-2005)
Expenditures on training are substantial given the number of participants for two reasons.
First, with durations of up to two years, training programmes are relatively long in Germany
compared to most OECD countries. Second, participants usually receive a special form of bene¯t
(so-called maintenance allowance) while in the programme, which is of the same amount as UB
or UA. Until 2005 these bene¯ts did not a®ect remaining UB claims and, hence, increased total
bene¯t claims, thus providing strong incentives to participate in training.
In terms of the number of participants, job search assistance has become the most important
activation measure, by far, in recent years. Expenditures are moderate because durations are
short (up to three months but usually no more than one month). Support of self-employment
also has gained importance in recent years while the use of subsidised employment is declining,
both in the number of entries and in durations and expenditure.11
11 Besides the usual counselling and placement services, there are also special instruments for youth, elderly
unemployed and the disabled in Germany. For further details on these measures and German unemployment
insurance see Wunsch (2006).
174.2 Data and population of interest
With the exception of the preference and programme cost parameters, all parameters of the
model are calibrated using an administrative database which has been built up by the German
Institute for Employment Research. The database is a 2% random sample from all individuals
who have been subject to German social insurance at least once since 1990. It covers the
period 1990-2005 and combines spell information from social insurance records, programme
participation records and the bene¯t payment and jobseeker registers of the PES. Thus, it
provides detailed information on employment status (employed, unemployed with or without
programme participation) on a daily basis for the period 1990-2005.
The database comprises very detailed information in several dimensions. Personal character-
istics include education, age, gender, marital status, number of children, profession, nationality
and health. The bene¯t payment register provides information on type and amount of bene¯ts
received, remaining bene¯t claims and imposition of sanctions. The jobseeker register includes
information on the desired form of employment, compliance with bene¯t conditions and the
number of placement propositions by the PES. Moreover, the data comprise information on
employments including form of employment, industry, occupational status and wages. With re-
spect to programme participation the data cover type of the programme as well as planned and
actual duration. Detailed regional information, which include federal state, local unemployment
rate, migration, demographic and industry structure, infrastructure and urbanity, complement
the database (see the technical appendix for a full list of variables).
For the simulation, the model is calibrated to the population of West German workers who
registered unemployed with the PES between January 2000 and December 2002 and received
bene¯ts from the unemployment insurance system (UB or UA).12 To concentrate on the main
body of the workforce, apprentices, young men doing their civilian or military service as well as
elderly workers in special forms of employment are excluded. This reduced sample is referred to
as the reference population of interest in the following.
12 Note that this excludes recipients of social assistance.
184.3 Calibration
In the simulation, time units are de¯ned by half-months. This is the smallest level of aggregation
which is reasonable with the data. Human capital is measured in terms of wages and calibrated
using the wage from the last employment spell before entering unemployment.13 The de¯nition of
search e®ectiveness is more complicated since it is not observed in the data. Here, it is estimated
by the contribution of variables related to search e®ectiveness to the probability of ¯nding
employment within 3 months after entering unemployment. Concretely, search e®ectiveness of
individual j is estimated as
^ pj = P(Y = 1jX = xj;Z = zj) ¡ P(Y = 1jX = xj) (14)
= P(Y = 1jX = xj;Z = zj) ¡ EZ[P(Y = 1jX = xj;Z = zj)]
where Y = 1 if the worker succeeded in ¯nding employment within 3 months after entering
unemployment, and where Z is a vector of variables that are related to search e®ectiveness
while X contains all other variables that a®ect the job ¯nding probability. A probit model is
estimated with Z including - inter alia - measurements of labour market attachment, duration of
past unemployment spells, compliance with bene¯t conditions, number of placement propositions
by the PES in the past, local labour market conditions, health, foreigner status and presence of
(young) children. See Appendix B for more details.14
Preferences are parametrised as follows: The half-monthly discount factor ¯ is chosen to match
an interest rate of 4% per annum, which prevailed in the EURO area in the period of interest.
Period-utility over consumption is assumed to be logarithmic, i.e. u(c) ´ ln(c), but speci¯ca-
tions with intertemporal elasticities of substitution below and above one are tested as well. To
calibrate the disutility of e®ort, e, an approach similar to the one suggested by Pavoni and
13 Most individuals enter directly from employment (71%). For all other persons, the wage is depreciated
according to the calibrated wage depreciation rate for the time between leaving employment and entering
unemployment. Moreover, for part-time-workers the wage is scaled up to obtain an approximate fulltime-
equivalent. Figure 8 in Appendix E displays the corresponding wages. See Appendix B for more details.
14 In the numerical solution h and p are discretised, while U is treated as continuous variables. For h and p the
grids are geometrically spaced at rate 10% with 20 grid points chosen for h and 10 for p. The grid chosen for
U has 500 equidistant points in the interval [50;1500]. For each combination of h and p, the value functions
for all policies with respect to U are computed using Chebychev polynomials up to the 20th order.
19Violante (2005a, 2006), which originates from common practice in calibrating macroeconomic
models, is used. Let the disutility of time n spent working be logarithmic as well, and denote
by Á the relative weight on leisure versus consumption. Assuming a standard Cobb-Douglas
production function, the static optimality condition of the worker yields a value of Á = 2:35
given a labour share of 0:73 (BMAS, 2003), a consumption-income ratio of 0:72 (Statistisches
Bundesamt, 2000-2002) and a fraction of time spent working of n = 0:3. This implies a value for
the disutility of work e®ort of e = Á[ln(1) ¡ ln(1 ¡ n)] = 0:84 (Chari, Christiano, and Kenhoe,
1995). For the baseline calibration it is assumed that the disutility of e®ort during unemploy-
ment equals the one during work. Yet, as a sensitivity check the case where only half of time
spent on work is spent on search and programme participation is considered as well.
Nonparametric estimates of the baseline exit rates to employment as well as the wage de-
preciation and accumulation rates without participation in JA or TR can be obtained from
nonparticipants who are matched to the reference population of interest using the radius match-
ing estimator proposed and applied by Lechner and Wunsch (2006). The matching is performed
because interest is in the values of these parameters for the reference population which also
includes participants and, therefore, di®ers systematically from actual nonparticipants in char-
acteristics that also a®ect the exit rate to employment as can be seen from Table ?? in the
technical appendix. However, as is argued in Appendix D, the data are su±ciently rich to con-
trol for the potential sources of selection bias with respect to the reference population of interest
by use of matching techniques. See Appendix C for all details.
It turns out that the job ¯nding rate is increasing in both h and p. However, the impact of
p is much stronger, and for intermediate to high values of h the job ¯nding rate stays almost
constant. The estimate for the wage depreciation rate is ^ ±h = 0:985. For the wage accumulation
rate during employment a value of 1:003 is obtained.15
In order to calibrate the job-search-assistance and training technologies, estimates of the
e®ects of JA and TR of di®erent durations on, respectively, p and h for the reference population
of interest are required, because each period the planner has to decide whether the worker
15 In the simulation, depreciation and accumulation of h and p are stochastic. The respective depreciation and
accumulation probabilities are calculated from the respective depreciation and accumulation and the geometric
rate at which the grids for h and p are spaced.
20should be assigned to a programmes or, if he already attends a programme, whether he should
stay for another period. However, when trying to estimate these e®ects two kinds of selection
problems arise. First, as can be seen from Table ?? in the technical appendix, the respective
programme participants di®er systematically from the population of interest in ways that are
also related to the respective outcome variables of interest. Second, actual programme durations
are potentially endogenous. In the reference population of interest actual durations di®er from
planned durations by more than 15% in 11% and 21% of the cases for JA and TR, respectively.
Thus, actual programme durations cannot be regarded as exogenous.
Given su±ciently rich data, both selection problems can be solved using a so-called dynamic
(or sequential) treatment evaluation approach as suggested by Lechner and Miquel (2001, 2005).
The idea is to consider an n-period programme as a sequence of n one-period programmes and
to control for selection at the beginning of each of the n periods. Selectivity between programme
participants and the population of interest can then be controlled for at the beginning of the
sequence (at t = 0), whereas endogeneity of programme durations is accounted for by selection
correction in the n ¡ 1 following periods. The e®ect of a programme of length n relative to a
programme of length n ¡ 1 can then be obtained by comparing the sequence `participating up
to t = n' with the sequence `participating up to t = n ¡ 1 and not participating in t = n'.16
Conditions for identi¯cation of the e®ects of JA and TR of di®erent durations for the reference
population of interest and their validity in this application are discussed in detail in Appendix
D. The e®ects are estimated using an adapted version of the sequential matching estimator
proposed by Lechner (2004, 2006). See Appendix D for all details on this estimator. For each
of the two programmes, JA and TR, the estimation is performed separately in two subgroups
of high and low search e®ectiveness and skills, respectively (sample divided at the median of
the respective variable). For JA the e®ects of completing one half-month of JA compared with
nonparticipation as well as two versus one, three versus two, four versus three and ¯ve versus
four half-months of JA are estimated. For TR there are not enough observations to perform the
16 An alternative way of estimating the e®ect of programmes of di®erent durations would be to apply the
methodology of Hirano and Imbens (2004) for continuous treatments (see e.g. Flores-Lagunes, Gonzalez, and
Neumann, 2007). However, this method assumes that selection into programmes of di®erent durations is fully
determined at the beginning of the programme. That is, di®erent programme durations are not the outcome
of intermediate decisions after the programme started.
21estimation half-monthly. Here, six months of TR is compared with nonparticipation as well as
twelve months versus six months of TR.
It turns out that none of the programmes succeeds in raising search e®ectiveness or human
capital independent of programme duration (see the technical appendix).17 Since programme
participation is costly, it is, therefore, obvious that JA and TR should not be used in the
optimal policy. However, the simulation allows to identify regions of parameter values, for which
it is optimal to use these programmes, thus providing reference values, e.g. for the minimum
e®ectiveness such programmes must exhibit in order to be optimally used at all. Concretely,
di®erent values of the success rates of JA and TR, µJA and µTR, that match speci¯c accumulation
rates are simulated. Moreover, since the depreciation rate of search e®ectiveness cannot be
calibrated from the data because the e®ects of JA are zero, di®erent values of ±p will be tested
in the simulation.
Values for the cost parameters of JA and TR are calculated from total expenditures on the
respective programme per year (excluding bene¯t payments), the number of participants and
average programme durations from o±cial statistics (BA, 2001-2005). This yields programme
costs of ·JA = 190 and ·TR = 300 per half-month in EUR.
To parameterise the cost of a (currently unavailable) tight monitoring technology, the average
gross salary of a caseworker per half-month (about 1200 EUR according to BA, 2001-2005) is
divided by the number of unemployed a caseworker can reasonably take care of in a half-month.
A conservative value would be 20 unemployed which yields a value of 60 EUR. Allowing for some
administrative cost, the baseline value for ·JM is set to 100 EUR. This value will be varied to
check the sensitivity of the optimal use of JM and the other policies to ·JM.
The parameters of the policy implemented in West Germany in the period under consideration,
i.e. amount and duration of bene¯ts as well as programme durations and fraction of unemployed
subject to each policy in the period 2000-2002, are calculated directly from the data. Figure 8
in Appendix E displays the values of these parameters as a function of human capital.
17 This is consistent with the ¯ndings of Wunsch and Lechner (2007), who analyse the e®ectiveness of di®erent
forms of JA and TR using the same database.
224.4 Results
4.4.1 Optimal policy and bene¯t scheme for West Germany
Figure 1 shows the sequence of policies that would have been optimal for West Germany in the
period 2000-2002 in the absence of JM given that the same level of initial utility U0(h;p) is
provided to a worker with characteristics (h;p) as under the actual policy. As already suggested
by the ine®ectiveness of JA and TR, these policies are not part of the optimal scheme.
If JM is unavailable, the duration for which UI is optimally used is completely determined
by human capital because human capital depreciation is the dominant factor in this case. At
the lowest level of h, the returns to search are too low relative to promised utility, so that it is
not worthwhile to provide search incentives at all. However, the higher the initial level of h the
higher the returns to search, and the longer it is optimal to incentivise the worker. Note that
not providing search incentives for the lowest-skilled is a feature of many existing policies since,
often, the level of bene¯ts for this group of people is so high that their reservation wages lie
above their expected wages.
















































Note: The human capital grids are geometrically spaced at rate 10% with the lowest
grid absorbing all wages below the second lowest grid. Grip points of 14 and
above all lie in the top 5%-quantile of the human capital distribution.
23There are several ways how the result of di®erent optimal durations of UI, i.e. UI claims, for
jobseekers with di®erent levels of human capital could be interpreted. Clearly, in contrast to
the amount of bene¯ts, it is probably very di±cult to implement a policy that discriminates
claim durations according to previous wages. Under the assumption that wages increase with
tenure and age, one way to (at least partly) implement such a scheme would be to di®erentiate
claims by previous time of contribution to the unemployment insurance and age. This is already
common practice in many countries, including Germany.
Another way of looking at this result would be to use it to choose the optimal policy scheme
for di®erent populations of unemployed according to their median or mean characteristics. That
means that countries where unemployment is a problem mainly of the very low-skilled can choose
shorter durations of UI, while countries where higher-skilled people are a®ected as well should
allow for longer UI claims. This would imply that the di®erence, e.g. between the short UI
claims in the U.S. or Australia and the longer claims in Germany, is actually in line with the
characteristics of the optimal scheme.
For West Germany, the optimal duration of UI at median human capital would be 13 months.
Interestingly, this is very close to the maximum unemployment bene¯t claim of 12 months that
has been introduced with the last large reform of unemployment insurance in Germany for the
majority of unemployed (aged below 55).
Figure 2 displays the optimal sequence of bene¯ts in terms of the replacement rate (Panel
(a)) as well as the wage tax/subsidy upon reemployment (Panel (b)) for high, medium and low-
skilled workers. As derived from the model, bene¯ts decrease during UI in order to keep search
e®ort high, and they remain constant during SA where positive e®ort is no longer required.
The optimal level of social assistance ranges between 350-750 EUR with about 600 EUR at the
median values of human capital and search e®ectiveness. Interestingly, the latter approximately
equals the sum of the so-called unemployment bene¯ts II (345 EUR) and the supplementary
housing bene¯ts that have been introduced recently in Germany as the baseline welfare payment
that can be received after unemployment insurance payments have been exhausted.
24Figure 2: Optimal bene¯ts and wage tax/subsidy
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Note: The skill levels correspond to the 5th, 10th and 15th 5%-quantile of the human capital distribution.
The replacement rate is the last (gross) wage before entering unemployment divided by the bene¯t.
The wage tax is (gross) wage minus consumption upon reemployment in % of the (gross) wage.
The wage tax decreases during UI because wages decline faster than bene¯ts. For low values
of human capital, a wage subsidy is paid from the beginning of the unemployment spell to
keep the value of working su±ciently high to make search attractive. For high values of human
capital, the wage tax turns into a subsidy only after some time when the value of working has
deteriorated due to human capital depreciation.
Panel (a) of Figure 2 also displays the e®ective replacement rates (mean bene¯ts as a fraction
of the last gross wage before entering unemployment) of unemployment bene¯ts (UB) and as-
sistance (UA) under the policy actually implemented in the period 2000-2002. It turns out that
optimal bene¯ts are considerably larger at the beginning of the unemployment spell. For low
to medium levels of human capital, they decline to a level which is about the same as actual
unemployment assistance (UA). However, for higher-skilled workers the long-run replacement
rate is considerably lower.
The fact that optimal long-run bene¯ts are often smaller than actual bene¯ts and the inef-
fectiveness of JA and TR (i.e. the waste of their cost) lead to considerable government budget
savings that can be realised by switching from the actual to the optimal policy. When providing
the same initial utility to agents as under the actual policy, 32% of actual expenditures could be
saved (20-40% by type of unemployed). For West Germany in the period 2000-2002 this would
have implied savings in the expenditures on bene¯ts, JA and TR of about 28 billion EUR.
254.4.2 Optimal use of job search monitoring
Figure 3 shows that if JM were available it would be used in the optimal scheme. The total
duration for which it is optimal to incentivise agents remains constant because it is determined
by human capital depreciation which is una®ected by JM. However, the relative use of JM and
UI depends on the relation of the incentive costs during UI to the monitoring cost. The larger
human capital and search e®ectiveness, the higher the exit rate to employment so that it is less
costly to provide search incentives relative to incurring the ¯xed monitoring cost ·JM = 100
EUR. Therefore, UI is used for longer periods while JM is used for shorter periods the higher
h and p. Note that in the absence of p in the model it is not possible to fully determine the
optimal timing and duration of JM, which provides an important role for p in the model even
in the absence of job search assistance.


































































































(b) High search effectiveness (p = 5)
Note: Monitoring cost per half-month ·
JM = 100 EUR. The human capital grids are geometrically spaced at
rate 10% with the lowest grid absorbing all wages below the second lowest grid. Grid points of 14 and
above all lie in the top 5%-quantile of the human capital distribution. p = 1;5 refers to the ¯rst and
¯fths 20%-quantile of the distribution of search e®ectiveness.
In case JM is used, bene¯ts remain constant as predicted by the model. However, they are
usually smaller than during UI because of the absence of the incentive costs. Instead, the
monitoring cost has to be incurred. Overall, the budget savings from using JM as well are
negligible. What happens is that about the same amount of money is spent in a di®erent way.
It remains to be assessed how the use of the monitoring technology depends on the monitoring
cost. In Figure 4, ·JM is varied from 100-1000 EUR per half-month and the results are displayed
26for a worker with median skills and two levels of search e®ectiveness. Naturally, the use of JM is
reduced with increasing cost. Yet, even at rather extreme values of ·JM JM is still used. What
changes is that JM is used later in the unemployment spell after increasing use of UI because
the cost of providing search incentives decreases relative to the monitoring cost. As a result of
increased use of UI, bene¯ts decline to lower levels the larger ·JM, which compensates for the
higher ¯xed cost of monitoring.
To conclude, it would be optimal to use monitoring for almost all levels of human capital and
even when monitoring costs are high. However, since the budget savings from using JM are
negligible and the job ¯nding rates are unchanged, there is no bene¯t from introducing it in
West Germany. This conclusion is strengthened by the argument that monitoring can probably
be only imperfect in reality and that its implementation would require hiring a large number of
caseworkers.
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(b) High search effectiveness (p = 5)
Note: Human capital is set to its median grid. Simulation for 3 years. p = 1;5 refers to the ¯rst and ¯fths
20%-quantile of the distribution of search e®ectiveness.
4.4.3 Optimal use of job search assistance
The model allows to identify conditions under which JA and TR are used in the optimal policy
scheme. For this purpose, the e®ects of the programmes are simulated as the probability that
JA and TR rspectively increase search e®ectiveness and human capital by 10% within a half-
27month.18 Note that this probability can be interpreted as the success rate of the programmes,
µJA and µTR, when h and p change in 10%-steps.
In the ¯rst step, the choice between UI, JM, JA and SA is simulated. The success rate of JA
for a 10% increase in p is varied between 10-100%, which corresponds to an accumulation rate
of p, denoted by ®p, of 1-10% per half-month. Note that even if ®p = 10% the impact on the
exit rate to employment would range only between 2-10 %-points per half-month, and in the
long run it would not exceed an overall gain of 20 %-points. Thus, the range of accumulation
rates considered is reasonable.
The overall duration for which it is optimal to incentivise agents is, again, unchanged because
it is determined by human capital depreciation which is una®ected by JA. As expected, JA is
never used for agents with the highest level of search e®ectiveness (p = 5) because the returns
to JA would be zero. It is also never used for the lowest-skilled or once h has depreciated to its
lowest level (h = 1) because the value of working it too low to make search attractive in this
case, even if the job ¯nding rate could be increased considerably by use of JA.19
The simulation shows that the accumulation rate of p must exceed 3% per half-month for JA
to be optimally used at all. This result is independent of the cost of JA because the incentive
costs are the main determinant here. Once they are too high relative to the (expected) returns
to JA, JA will not be used independent of its direct cost. If the accumulation rate of p is
su±ciently large, then the following results are obtained. First, upon failure of JA it is always
optimal to stay in the programme. Second, once p has depreciated after successful use of JA, it
is always optimal to return to JA as long as h > 1. Moreover, the larger the depreciation rate
of p, the earlier the worker should be re-assigned to JA. In both cases, the returns to JA do
not fall, the direct and incentive costs are unchanged, and the e®ort compensation cost either
falls with promised utility after failure of JA, or its increase after successful use of JA is only
small and in most cases compensated by a fall during the policy that followed JA. Third, after
use of JA, that policy is used which would be optimal in that period in the absence of JA given
18 A 10% increase in h or p corresponds to an increase in the respective variable by one grid point in the
simulation.
19 In this and the following sections the values of p refer to the 20%-quantiles of the distribution of search
e®ectiveness because the exit rate to employment only changes across these quantiles in the simulation. In
contrast, the values of h refer to the grids used in the simulation.
28characteristics (h;p). Since p increases after successful use of JA this means that the use of UI
is e®ectively prolonged and that of JM is shorted.
When ®p ¸ 8%, the returns to JA are so high and the incentive costs so low that it is
always optimal to assign everyone with p < 5 and h > 1 immediately to JA when entering
unemployment as long as initial promised utility is not too high. Since the latter increases with
h, JA should be used for high-skilled workers only later in the unemployment spell after UI
when U and h have decreased su±ciently. In particular, JA will not be used at the beginning of
unemployment if h is high even if ®p = 10% per half-month. Once assigned to JA it is optimal
to stay in the programme until the highest level of p is reached when ®p is high.
Note that the lower ®p, the higher the incentive costs during JA and the lower the returns
to JA. Moreover, after success of JA promised utility and, therefore, the bene¯t and e®ort
compensation costs increase whereas they fall during UI and remain constant during JM. This
is the reason why, for ®p < 8% it is no longer optimal to always stay in JA until the maximum p
is reached. Furthermore, for agents with p = 4 and ®p = 7%, or p = 3 and ®p = 5:5%, or p = 2
and ®p = 4% JA should not be used until later in the unemployment spell after use of UI when
promised utility has declined su±ciently and the incentive costs during UI have become too high
relative to those during JA because of human capital depreciation. This is also the reason why
it is sometimes optimal to return to JA even if p has not declined. When ®p is below the above
values at the respective levels of p, JA will not be used at all because the incentive costs have
become too high relative to the returns to JA.
For the case where the accumulation rate of p changes with p (or h), the same arguments apply
as above because it makes no di®erence for the results whether the variation in µJA happens
across individuals, within the unemployment spell or across otherwise equal economies.
The results on the optimal use of JA can be summarised as follows. The accumulation rate
of p must exceed 3% in order for JA to be used at all. The higher search e®ectiveness, the
higher the required minimum accumulation rate. When JA is part of the optimal scheme, it
is usually optimal to use it at the beginning of the unemployment spell. If p depreciates after
successful use of JA, jobseekers should be re-assigned to JA later in the unemployment spell. If
29the accumulation rate of p or the success rate of JA is either high or low, the optimal duration
of JA is relatively short (0.5-2 months). For intermediate cases it can be longer (1-5 months).
With respect to optimal bene¯ts, the predictions of the model apply. They should fall - as
under UI - when JA fails and they should increase if it succeeds. In the simulation, the increases
in bene¯ts are small. They could be implemented as premia that are paid to jobseekers during
or after participation in JA.
Now, what are the implications of the availability of an e®ective job-search-assistance tech-
nology for the government budget? If ®p > 3% so that JA is part of the optimal policy, budget
savings of 3-8% could be realised compared to the optimal policy without JA.
4.4.4 Optimal use of training
In contrast to JA, TR not only a®ects the exit rate to employment but also wages, which are
the main determinant of the value of employment. The latter is very important because even if
the exit rate is high, search incentives are low if the value of employment is low. Moreover, the
e®ect of h on the job ¯nding rate is relatively small, especially for larger values of h.
Since in the simulation increases in h directly translate into equivalent changes in wages, the
range of reasonable values for the returns to TR are di®erent from those for JA. According
to Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999), Martin and Grubb (2001) and Kluve and Schmidt
(2002), the returns to training programmes in terms of wage increases usually do not exceed
10%, and in most cases such programmes have durations of more than a half-month, usually of
1-6 months but in some countries like Germany even of 12 months or more. Thus, accumulation
rates of more than 3-4% per half-month seem very unlikely.
As h accumulates and depreciation of h is delayed during TR, the point from which SA is
optimal is delayed as well, thus, increasing the period for which it is optimal to incentivise agents.
Note that this justi¯es policies where participation prolongs bene¯t claims as implemented, for
example, in several Scandinavian countries and Germany. Yet, under the optimal policy bene¯ts
should necessarily decrease during UI and after failure of TR, which is usually not the case for
existing policies.
30Figure 5 summarises the optimal use of TR in the absence of JA at di®erent accumulation rates
of human capital for the human capital grids used in the simulation. The grids are geometrically
spaced at rate 10% with the lowest grid absorbing all levels of h below the second lowest grid.
Because of the latter, the results for the lowest grid are not displayed, because an increase by
one grid point corresponds to an increase in h by much more than 10% so that the return to
TR would be much higher than for the other grids and the results would not be comparable.
Figure 5: Optimal use of training
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Note: The human capital grids are geometrically spaced at rate 10% with the lowest grid absorbing all levels
of h below the second lowest grid. p = 1;5 refers to the ¯rst and ¯fths 20%-quantile of the distribution
of search e®ectiveness.
It turns out that a wage accumulation rate of at least ®h = 1:8% is necessary for TR to be
used at all, which means that the e®ect of TR must be relatively large. Below that, the returns
to TR are just too low given that both the incentive costs and direct cost during TR are high.
As ®h increases the incentive costs during TR decrease while the returns to TR increase. Yet
initially, TR will only be used for intermediate values of h. At high levels of h the incentive
cost is much smaller during UI than during TR and zero during JM so that these policies are
preferred if the returns to TR are not su±ciently high. In contrast, at low levels of h the ¯xed
cost of TR is prohibitively high given the returns to TR relative to what would have to be paid
in terms of the bene¯t and potential incentive and e®ort compensation cost during UI, JM and
SA. Clearly, the highest-skilled will never be trained because the returns to TR are zero.
As ®h increases further, the range of h for which it is optimal to use TR increases. Note
that the range increase faster the lower the ¯xed cost of TR, and also the lower p because the
31incentive costs during UI are higher so that the switch to TR occurs earlier. However, TR will
not be used as long as promised utility U is too high. Since under the actual policy initial
promised utility increases with h this implies that for workers who enter unemployment with
high human capital, TR should not be used until later in the unemployment spell after UI when
U and h have decreased su±ciently. Therefore, TR will not be used at the beginning of the
unemployment spell if h is high even if ®h = 10% per half-month.
Upon failure of TR, it is optimal to stay in the programme as long as h does not depreciate
to a level at which it is no longer optimal to use TR. If TR is successful, agents should stay in
the programme as long as promised utility U does not become prohibitively high. This implies
that if h and ®h are either low or high, TR should be relatively short (0.5-4 months), while at
intermediate values it can be rather long (more than 12 months possible) because of its strong
impact on the value of employment which makes TR a dominant policy.
What happens if, in addition to training, there is an e®ective job-search-assistance technology
available as well? For TR ®h is set to 2% while ®p is varied between 4-10% per half-month.
In this case, the accumulation rate of p must exceed 6% for JA to be used at all because the
e®ect of TR on the value of employment dominates the impact of JA on the job ¯nding rate.
Moreover, like TR, JA is never used at h ¸ 17 because promised utility is too high. If ®p = 7%,
JA is only used at low values of h where, in the absence of JA, it is not optimal to use TR
(h · 2). As ®p increases, JA is used both at the lower and the upper end of h = 1;:::;16 and for
all values of this range when ®p = 10%. In the latter case and at the upper end of the human
capital range JA is used at the beginning of the unemployment spell for 2-3 half-months, then
followed by TR. As p depreciates after successful use of JA, it is optimal to re-assign the worker
to JA whenever it falls to p < 4 if promised utility is relatively high and whenever it falls to
p < 5 otherwise. In case of reassignment, the optimal duration of JA is usually 1-2 half-months.
At the lower end of h when ®p < 10% optimal durations are usually longer, ranging from 2-4
months. Of course, the larger ®h the more TR dominates JA because of its impact on the value
of employment and the less JA is used. In particular, JA will no longer be used if ®h > 3:2%.
32Unfortunately, the budget implications of TR cannot be assessed. Clearly, expenditures dur-
ing unemployment are much higher because bene¯ts increase with h and relatively high direct
programme cost have to be incurred. However, since the model is simulated for the case where
workers remain unemployed, the returns in terms of tax revenue and saved expenditures during
unemployment once a jobseeker has found employment are not fully considered while the worst
case maximum expenditures during unemployment are calculated.20
4.5 Sensitivity analysis
The sensitivity of the results with respect to key parameters of the model is tested. However, it
has to be pointed out that the scope of the sensitivity analysis is limited by the numerical load
of the simulation (approximation of the value functions), in particular when key parameters of
the model are changed.
To simulate the case where there is uncertainty about the exit rate to employment or where
it changes once the optimal policy is implemented, the exit rate is perturbated by 10% in both
directions. It is found that a variation of the exit rate within this range does not change the
results.
The sensitivity of the results with respect to the choice of the utility function of the worker
is checked as well. Rather than log utility, u(c) = c1¡¾
1¡¾ is chosen with intertemporal elasticity
of substitution once above and once below one (¾ 2 f0:8;1:2g).21 Note that if ¾ is below
(above) one, initial utility provided by the actual policy is higher (lower) than in the baseline
case because the same level of consumption implies higher (lower) utility. Moreover, because of
(13) bene¯ts must decline more slowly (faster) upon failure of the activity when the incentive
constraint binds under UI, JA or TR. However, it is found that the optimal sequence of policies
remains unchanged. Because of the changed evolution of bene¯ts the main changes are with
respect to the implications for the government budget. For the baseline case without JM, JA
and TR the budget savings are reduced (increased) by 5 (3) %-points.
20 In each period where UI or JM are used, the returns are taken into account with weight one minus the job
¯nding rate. Under JA only the job ¯nding rate is a®ected so the full return is taken into account. However,
TR also a®ects the value of employment and that is only taken into account with a weight considerably smaller
than one.
21 The utility functions are normalised to match u(1) = 0 as under log utility.
33Finally, the disutility of e®ort, e, is allowed to vary between work and search. The simula-
tion is repeated for the case where only half of the time spent working is spent on search or
programme participation during unemployment. This implies a stronger preference for leisure
during unemployment and, hence, a higher disutility of e®ort of 0.93 rather than 0.84 in the
baseline case. Higher e implies higher incentive costs during UI, JA and TR but also makes
work relatively more attractive. In the simulation these e®ects seem to o®set each other because
all results remain unchanged.
5 Conclusion
Labour market policies for the unemployed combine passive income support with active measures
that aim at improving jobseekers' employment prospects. This paper extends the theoretical
framework developed by Pavoni and Violante (2005a) for the optimal choice between di®erent
active and passive policies for the unemployed to a setting which allows for policies that a®ect
the exit rate to employment but not productivity in the job. The most prominent example of
such a policy are job search assistance programmes which aim at increasing search e®ectiveness
and are one of the most widely used activation measures in OECD countries (OECD, 2007).
The advantages of these programmes are that they are relatively short and, hence, inexpensive
and that they have proven to be quite e®ective in many countries (e.g. Fay, 1996; Heckman,
LaLonde, and Smith, 1999; Martin and Grubb, 2001; Kluve and Schmidt, 2002). Therefore, it is
important to take these programmes into account when considering the optimal design of labour
market policies.
The economy considered by Pavoni and Violante (2005a) is characterised by workers who
di®er with respect to human capital which depreciates during unemployment but can be raised
by training. With respect to policy instruments the insurer can choose between unemployment
bene¯ts, social assistance, job search monitoring, training and wage taxes/subsidies. This setting
is enriched by introducing search e®ectiveness as additional source of worker heterogeneity and
allowing for it to be raised by a job-search-assistance technology. Thereby, the model allows to
optimise over the most important instruments of active and passive labour market policies in all
34critical respects, namely the allocation among heterogeneous workers, the amount of bene¯ts,
and the duration and timing within the unemployment spell. Thus, it can be used to answer a
wide range of interesting policy questions.
The theoretical results that can be derived from the enriched model con¯rm that the presence
of the information asymmetry with respect to the worker's e®ort requires bene¯ts to increase
upon success of his activity and to fall upon failure in order to incentivise the worker, which
underlines the generality of this result ¯rst derived by Shavell and Weiss (1979). It is shown that
social assistance remains an optimal policy of last resort in the enriched setting. Furthermore, it
is con¯rmed that it is never optimal to switch from monitored to unmonitored search. However,
human capital dynamics are no longer necessary for policy transition to occur because of the
dynamics implied by search e®ectiveness as additional state variable.
In order to derive more detailed insights on the optimal sequence of policies the model is
calibrated to the West German economy in the period 2000-2002. Assessing the optimality of the
West German policy in this period it turns out that about 32% or 28 billion EUR of government
expenditure could have been saved by switching to the optimal scheme. It is shown that for
low levels of human capital wage subsidies should be used which, because of human capital
depreciation, implies that their use becomes more likely the longer unemployment duration.
Moreover, when comparing the features of the optimal scheme with the recent reforms of the
German system the optimal duration of an unemployment insurance claim and the optimal level
of social assistance for a worker with median characteristics are strikingly close to what has been
introduced recently in Germany.
The simulation is also used to assess whether a currently unavailable tight monitoring tech-
nology would be bene¯cial and worth introducing in West Germany. It is found that it would be
optimal to use monitoring for almost all levels of human capital and even when monitoring costs
are high. Moreover, the optimal timing and duration of monitoring within the unemployment
spell depends on the worker's search e®ectiveness. Thus, there is an important role for search
e®ectiveness in the model even in the absence of a job-search-assistance technology. However,
the net gains from monitoring are too small to justify its introduction.
35Another salient feature of the simulation is that by varying the parameters of the job-search-
assistance and training technologies it is possible to obtain more general insights on their optimal
use. It is found that existing ALMPs already share some but not all features of the optimal
scheme. In line with existing ALMPs it is shown that participation prolongs the period for
which unemployment insurance payments rather than social assistance are optimal. Moreover,
for job search assistance (JA) it is usually optimal to use it at the beginning of unemployment
as well as after depreciation of search e®ectiveness following the successful use of JA later in
the unemployment spell. Furthermore, the optimal duration of JA is usually short. However, it
is shown that the accumulation rate of search e®ectiveness must exceed 3% per half-month in
order for JA to be used at all.
For training (TR) it turns out that a wage accumulation rate of at least 1.8% per half-month
is necessary for TR to be used at all, which means that the e®ect of TR must be relatively
large. Then, it is optimal to use TR for a range of intermediate values of human capital, which
increases the larger the e®ect of TR. The optimal duration of TR can be long for intermediate
accumulation rates while it should be relatively short otherwise. Because TR a®ects both the
job ¯nding rate and wages, it usually dominates JA. However, if JA is su±ciently e®ective, it is
optimal to use TR only after a short period of JA at the beginning of the unemployment spell.
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Some of the proofs are only sketched. In these cases, the detailed proofs are relegated to the
technical appendix (Wunsch, 2007).
Proposition 0: (i) The functions W, V and V i are concave in U (for all h and p). (ii) They
are jointly continuous in (U;h;p) and monotonically increasing in h and p. (iii) Let i¤(U;h;p)
be the implemented policy and c¤(U;h;p) > 0 be the optimal payment at (U;h;p). Then both








Proof of Proposition 0: See the technical appendix (Wunsch, 2007).
Proof of Proposition 1:












; y = f;s; (17)
where VU(Us;hf;pf) = WU(Us;hf;pf), strict concavity of u implies that bene¯ts and the net













Then, the strict concavity of u immediately implies the desired result. Q.E.D.
















where ¹UI ¸ 0 is the multiplier on the incentive compatibility constraint in (9). The result





where cf is consumption if job search failed during UI, and the strict concavity of u.















where ¹i ¸ 0 is the multiplier on the respective incentive compatibility constraint and (hJA;pJA) =
(hf;ps), (hTR;pTR) = (hs;pf). The desired result then follows immediately from next period's
envelope condition
JA : ¡VU(Uy;hf;py) =
1
u0(cy)
; y = f;s (27)
TR : ¡VU(Uy;hy;pf) =
1
u0(cy)
; y = f;s; (28)
and the strict concavity of u. Q.E.D.
(iii) The wage tax is de¯ned as ¿(hf) = w(hf)¡cs. Since during JM ct = cs
t = c
f
t and h ¸ hf
due to human capital depreciation the result is immediate. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: (i) The proof follows the same line of reasoning as Pavoni and
Violante (2005a,b) showing that in order for a policy to be strictly optimal at node (Ut;ht;pt), it
cannot be that at such a node SA is implemented with positive probability and, in period t+1,
a di®erent policy is implemented after SA with positive probability. See the technical appendix
(Wunsch, 2007) for all details of the proof.
(ii) Lemma A1 and A2 establish a ranking of the slopes of the value functions with respect
to the three state variables (U;h;p) under JA, JM, UI and SA in the general case and show
that this ranking does not depend on whether human capital dynamics are present or not. In
particular, they show that V JM declines more slowly with increasing U and declining p than
V UI. Lemma A3 then describes the dynamics of U under JM
Lemma A1: Let º(U;h;p) be the real number that solves VU(U;h;p) = ¡q0¡
(1 ¡ ¯)(U +
º(U;h;p))
¢
, where q ´ u¡1 is the inverse utility function and assume that º(U;h;p) is non-
increasing in U for every (h;p). Then value functions V i, i 2 fJM;UIg, with respect to U
satisfy
V UI
U (U;h;p) · V JM
U (U;h;p) (29)
for all triples (U;h;p).
Proof of Lemma A1: See the technical appendix (Wunsch, 2007).
Lemma A2: If V is submodular and both V and the V i, i 2 fSA;JM;UIg, are di®erentiable
in h and p, then their slopes with respect to h and p satisfy, respectively,
V UI
j (U;h;p) ¸ V JM
j (U;h;p) ¸ ^ V SA
j (U) = 0 (30)
for j 2 fh;pg and all triples (U;h;p).
Proof of Lemma A2: See the technical appendix (Wunsch, 2007).
Lemma A3: Recall that V is concave and assume that it is submodular. (i) If the imple-
41mented policy at (U,h,p) is JM and either concavity or submodularity is strict, then Uf(x) ¸ U
almost surely for all x 2 [0;1].
Proof of Lemma A3: From the ¯rst-order conditions for JM we have that
VU(U;h;p) = V JM
U (U;h;p) = VU(Uf;hf;pf) = VU(Uf(x);hf;pf) (31)
for (almost) all x 2 [0;1]. Since pf · p and hf · h, submodularity implies VU(U;hf;pf) ¸
VU(U;h;p). Then the desired result follows when either concavity or submodularity is strict at
(U,h,p). Q.E.D.
Since pf · p and U weakly increases during JM, Lemma A1 and A2 establish that V UI declines
faster than V JM so that a switch to UI will never occur after optimal use of JM. Q.E.D.
(iii) A necessary condition for JA to be used at all in period t is that search e®ectiveness
increases in expectation, i.e. that E(pt+1) = µJAps
t+1 + (1 ¡ µJA)p
f
t+1 > pt. Otherwise, it will
never be worthwhile to pay the cost ·JA. Now note that E(pt+1) = µJAf(pt) + (1 ¡ ±p)pt so
that the above condition can be rewritten as f(pt) > ±p
µJApt. Thus, this condition continues to
hold after use of JA if f0(p) ¸ ±p
µJA for all p. The right-hand side is constant while the left-hand
side is strictly decreasing in p when f is strictly concave. This implies that upon failure of
JA, f0(pf) ¸ ±p
µJA will always hold because pf · p and JA has been used at p. However, after
continuous success of JA the condition will fail to hold at some point when f is strictly concave
because ps > p. Q.E.D.
(iv) The proof follows the same line of reasoning as the one of Proposition 2 (iii). A necessary
condition for TR to be used at all in period t is that human capital increases in expectation, i.e.
that E(ht+1) = µTRhs
t+1+(1¡µTR)h
f
t+1 > ht. Otherwise, it will never be worthwhile to pay the
cost ·TR. Now note that E(ht+1) = µTRg(ht) + (1 ¡ ±h)ht so that the above condition can be
rewritten as g(ht) > ±h
µTRht. Thus, this condition continues to hold after use of TR if g0(h) ¸ ±h
µTR
for all h. The right-hand side is constant while the left-hand side is strictly decreasing in h when
g is strictly concave. This implies that upon failure of TR, g0(hf) ¸ ±h
µTR will always hold because
hf · h and TR has been used at h. However, after continuous success of TR the condition will
fail to hold at some point when g is strictly concave because hs > h. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: (i) If p remains constant during JM, it is su±cient to consider the
dynamics with respect to U. The ¯rst-order and envelope conditions for JM yield VU(U;p) =
V JM
U (U;p) = VU(Uf;p) implying that setting U = Uf is optimal. Thus, after use of JM all
state variables have the same values as one period before. Consequently, implementing JM every
period is always optimal, and if V is strictly concave this optimal policy is unique.
(ii) From Proposition 3 (i) and 2 (i) we know that under the conditions stated in Proposition
3 (ii), whenever JM or SA have been optimal at (U;p) they are absorbing. Thus, JA will never
be used thereafter. Now consider the case where UI is optimal at (U;p). If p remains constant
during UI, it is su±cient to consider the dynamics with respect to U. Lemma A4 shows that
the IC constraint is binding during UI in this case. Lemma A5 then establishes that whenever
UI is optimal at (U;p), V JA is more negatively sloped than V UI if µJA · ¼(p) and, hence, JA
will never be optimal in the next period.
Lemma A4: At any (U;p) where UI is optimal and either p = ^ p or ±p = 0, the incentive
compatibility constraint binds with ¹UI > 0 and we have U > Uf.
Proof of Lemma A4: Concavity of V together with (20) and (21) imply that U ¸ Uf. If the
IC binds, this implies immediately that U > Uf. Now assume that ¹UI = 0. The special form
of W in the absence of human capital dynamics and (22) then imply that U ¸ (1¡¯)Us+¯Uf.
42However, if Uf ¸ U, then Us > U from (13) and e > 0 and, hence, the IC constraint could
never be satis¯ed. Thus, we must have U > Uf whenever UI is optimal. Now note that the PK
constraints of all potential future states are linear in U and that the corresponding payments
can be written as c = u¡1¡
u(c)
¢
. The PK constraints for all potential future states can be
used to replace u(c). Since p remains unchanged during UI if either p = ^ p or ±p = 0, u(c) and,




strictly increasing and strictly convex in U for all potential future states (because u is strictly
concave). Thus, because U > Uf whenever UI is optimal, we have cUI > cf and ¹UI > 0 follows
immediately from the strict concavity of u. Q.E.D.




Proof of Lemma A5: From the ¯rst-order and envelope conditions for UI and JA we have,
respectively,
V UI







U (U;p) = µJAVU(Us
JA;ps) + (1 ¡ µJA)VU(U
f
JA;pf); (33)
where cUI and U
f




JA the respective values under JA. If cUI · cJA the envelope condition and the concavity
of u imply the desired result. So consider the case cUI > cJA. From Lemma A4 we know that
the IC constraint binds when UI is optimal, i.e. U = u(cUI)+¯U
f
UI. Satisfying the IC constraint
under JA, i.e. U ¸ u(cJA) + ¯U
f




UI if cUI > cJA. Then






















Since u is strictly concave this implies cUI · cJA, a contradiction to the assumption that
cUI > cJA. Q.E.D.
Since search e®ectiveness does not change during UI if either p = ^ p or ±p = 0, while promised
utility falls, Lemma A5 completes the proof of Proposition 3 (ii). Q.E.D.
(iii) Pavoni and Violante (2006) show that in the absence of JA and p as additional state
variable UI will never be followed by SA or JM (Proposition 2 in Pavoni and Violante, 2006).
From Proposition 3 (ii) we know that JA will never be used under the stated conditions and that
p remains unchanged. Thus, the setting is identical to the one of Pavoni and Violante (2005b)
with the conditioning on p kept implicit. Then their proof (Pavoni and Violante, 2005b) can be
used to show the desired result. Q.E.D.
43B Human capital and search e®ectiveness
Human capital is calibrated using the wage from the last employment spell before entering
unemployment. Most individuals enter directly from employment (71%). For all other persons,
the wage is depreciated according to the calibrated wage depreciation rate (±h = 0:985) for the
time between leaving employment and entering unemployment. Moreover, for parttime-workers
the wage is scaled up to obtain an approximate fulltime-equivalent.
Figure 6: Distribution of human capital and search e®ectiveness in the sample
Search e®ectiveness, which is not directly observable in the data, is estimated by the con-
tribution of variables related to search e®ectiveness to the probability of ¯nding employment
within 3 months after entering unemployment. Concretely, search e®ectiveness of individual j
is estimated as
^ pj = P(Y = 1jX = xj;Z = zj) ¡ P(Y = 1jX = xj) (36)
= P(Y = 1jX = xj;Z = zj) ¡ EZ[P(Y = 1jX = xj;Z = zj)]
where Y = 1 if the worker succeeded in ¯nding employment within 3 months after entering
unemployment, and where Z is a vector of variables that are related to search e®ectiveness
while X contains all other variables that a®ect the job ¯nding probability.
A probit model is estimated with X mainly including variables that are related to reservation
wages: gender, durtion and amount of remaining bene¯t claim, educational attainment, qual-
i¯cation, occupational status, age, marital status, past earnings, variables summarising past
employment histories that are not contained in Z. Because of the high dimensionality of X the
index x0¯ is used to integrate out Z.
The vector Z includes measurements of labour market attachment (number and total duration
of times out of labour force, time since last employment), duration of past unemployment spells
(mean duration, duration of last unemployment spell), compliance with bene¯t conditions (im-
position of sanctions, attendance of interviews at PES, cooperation with PES sta®), number of
placement propositions by the PES in the past, labour market conditions (local labour market
44conditions, seasonality dummies, industry and occupation dummies), health, foreigner status
(control for potential language problems), presence of (young) children, lone parent status, par-
ticipation in JA in the past, realised wage increases and decreases in the past (control for ability
to ¯nd better employment).
C Estimation of the hazard rates and the wage depreciation and
accumulation rates
Nonparametric estimates of the baseline exit rates to employment without participation in JA
or TR as well as the wage depreciation and accumulation rates can be obtained from nonpar-
ticipants who are matched to the reference population of interest using the radius matching
estimator proposed and applied by Lechner and Wunsch (2006). The matching is performed
because interest is in the values of these parameters for the reference population which also
includes participants and, therefore, di®ers systematically from actual nonparticipants in char-
acteristics that also a®ect the exit rate to employment and wages. Moreover, to estimate the
wage depreciation and accumulation rates, selective subgroups of nonparticipants are used.
Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2006) apply a matching procedure, that is based on the propen-
sity score,22 and has the following advantages. To allow for higher precision when many `good'
comparison observations are available, they incorporate the idea of calliper or radius matching
(e.g. Dehejia and Wahba, 2002) into the standard algorithm used for example by Ger¯n and
Lechner (2002). Second, matching quality is increased by exploiting the fact that appropriate
weighted regressions that use the sampling weights from matching have the so-called double
robustness property. This property implies that the estimator remains consistent if either the
matching step is based on a correctly speci¯ed selection model, or the regression model is cor-
rectly speci¯ed (e.g. Rubin, 1979; Jo®e, Ten Have, Feldman, and Kimmel, 2004). Moreover, this
procedure may reduce small sample bias as well as asymptotic bias of matching estimators (see
Abadie and Imbens, 2006) and thus increase robustness of the estimator. For more information
on this estimator and its performance see Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2006).
The exit rates to employment are approximated by the probability to ¯nd employment within
2 months after entering unemployment. Before that, exit rates are extremely small due to labour
market frictions. In order not to pick up these frictions, the 2-month probability is chosen rather
than the immediate exit rate. They are estimated in 100 subgroups de¯ned by 20 equidistant
quantiles of the human capital distribution and 5 equidistant quantiles of the distribution of
search e®ectiveness. The number of nonparticipants available in the subgroups varies between
155 and 1670 observations with the vast majority of cells having more than 700 observations.
The results are displayed in the left panel of Figure 7. For the simulation a smooth function
which is ¯tted to these estimates is used (see the right panel of Figure 7).
The wage depreciation rate is calculated from the weighted mean wage of nonparticipants who
¯nd employment within 3 month after entering unemployment and the weighted mean wage of
nonparticipants who ¯nd employment only within 12-14 months. In turn, the wage accumulation
rate is calculated from the weighted mean wage nonparticipants, who ¯nd employment, receive
early (months 1-3) and later (months 12-14) in the employment spell.
22 The propensity scores are estimated by binary probit models for each comparison of interest. The estimation
equations have been subjected to extensive speci¯cation tests.









1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 h









1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 h
pi(h,1) pi(h,2) pi(h,3) pi(h,4) pi(h,5)
Note: Left panel: probability to exit to employment within 2 months after entering unemployment. Right
panel: ¯tted hazard functions using logarithmic functions.
D Identi¯cation and estimation of the e®ects of JA and TR of di®erent
durations
Here, the population for which the e®ects are to be estimated is an entry sample into unemploy-
ment that is de¯ned independent of any programme participation later in the unemployment
spell. Lechner and Miquel (2001, 2005) show that in this case, the e®ects of interest are iden-
ti¯ed under the so-called weak dynamic conditional independence assumption (W-DCIA). This
assumption states, ¯rst, that conditional on confounding variables at t = 0, potential outcomes
measured from time ¿ ¸ 1 onwards are independent of programme participation in period t = 1.
This would account for any selectivity between programme participants and the population of
interest. Second, conditional on participation status up to time t and confounding variables of
all periods up to time t, potential outcomes are independent of participation in period t + 1.
This would account for endogeneity of programme durations. The third part of the W-DCIA
is a common-support requirement which demands overlap in the control variables between the
populations involved in each of the selection steps.
To judge whether W-DCIA is plausible in this particular application, ¯rst, the confounding
variables for programme participation relative to the reference population of interest have to
be identi¯ed. This comparison is mainly driven by the di®erence between participants and
nonparticipants in a particular programme. Second, those variables have to be detected which
in°uence both outcomes and changes in treatment status, i.e. the decision between staying in
the programme for another period and leaving.
Before discussing the determinants of selectivity, the outcome variables of interest have to be
de¯ned in order to identify the subset of confounding variables among these determinants. The
choice of the outcome variables of interest is driven by the de¯nition of search e®ectiveness and
human capital in the calibration. For job search assistance the probability of ¯nding employment
within three months after completing a spell of JA is chosen. For training the impact on human
capital is estimated by the e®ect of TR on average wages during employment. Besides the
initial levels of search e®ectiveness and human capital, for both outcome variables the main
driving factors are presumably gender, age, educational attainment, health, presence of (young)
children, profession, industry, desired form of employment and local labour market conditions.
46All these factors are captured by the data. Moreover, information on past employment histories
and compliance with bene¯t conditions indirectly captures unobserved factors like ability and
motivation.
Selection into programmes from the reference population is driven by programme eligibility,
selection by caseworkers and self-selection by the unemployed. By construction of the sample, all
unemployed are eligible because they receive unemployment insurance payments. Caseworkers
select on the basis of an assessment of the employment prospects and the speci¯c quali¯cation
needs of the unemployed. According to German legislation they, furthermore, have to take into
account the chances of the unemployed for completing a speci¯c programme successfully, and
the situation in the local labour market. Thus, caseworker decisions are basically driven by
the same factors as the outcome variables themselves. Similar arguments apply to self-selection
by the unemployed because they also compare their employment prospects with and without a
programme as well as the corresponding costs in terms of e®ort or potentially foregone bene¯ts in
case of refusal to participate. For training an additional and rather strong incentive to participate
is the prolongation of total bene¯t claims. Since remaining bene¯t claims are observed in the
data, this can be captured.
Decisions to leave or stay in the programme are driven by factors that change after entering
a programme. The most important factors are probably the arrival of job o®ers, exhaustion of
bene¯t claims and signi¯cant changes in health conditions. Other factors may be noncompliance
with bene¯t conditions, changes in family status, moving to another place, or take up or loss of
a minor employment,23 and all of these as well as exhaustion of bene¯ts are directly observed
in the data. Changes in health conditions are observed if they are severe enough to a®ect
unemployment insurance status. Arrival of job o®ers is not directly observed in the data, but
the number of placement propositions by the PES per spell.24 To approximate the arrival
of job o®ers at or up to a speci¯c point in time a Heckman (1979)-type selection model for
the log number of placement propositions per day which accounts for zero propositions in the
spell is estimated in the subsample of nonparticipants using a rich set of time-invariant (or
deterministically changing) and time-varying variables measured before programme start as
explanatory variables. The number of placement propositions at di®erent points in time is then
predicted for all individuals in the sample using the updated measurement of the time-varying
covariates.
In summary, most of the potentially confounding factors are directly observed in the data.
Moreover, those that are not directly observed either can be controlled for indirectly by infor-
mation on past employment histories and compliance with bene¯t conditions, like e.g. ability or
motivation, or can be approximated by use of observed variables, like arrival of job o®ers. Thus,
the data are su±ciently rich to capture the main sources of selection bias at the di®erent points
in time before and during programme participation.
Lechner (2004, 2006) proposes a sequential nearest-neighbour matching estimator where the
matching is based on propensity scores to estimate the e®ects of di®erent sequences of pro-
grammes for a population de¯ned within one of the sequences. Consider the case where interest
is in estimating the e®ect of sequence S0 = (S0
1;S0
2) compared to S1 = (S1
1;S1
2) for the popula-
tion de¯ned by S0
1. In the ¯rst step, the population de¯ned by S1
1 is matched to the population
of interest S0
1 based on the estimated propensity score of the corresponding selection equation.
Second, the population de¯ned by S1
2 is matched to those observations in S1
1 that served as
23 To provide additional work incentives bene¯t recipients can earn additional labour income without losing their
claim if they work less than 15 hours per week.
24 A placement proposition is a job vacancy proposed to the jobseeker by the caseworker.
47matches in the previous step based on the propensity scores from this and the ¯rst selection
step. In a similar vein, the population de¯ned by S0
2 is matched to the one de¯ned by S0
1
based on the corresponding propensity score. To obtain an estimate of the e®ect of interest,
the reweighed outcome of the population de¯ned by S0
2 is then subtracted from the reweighed
outcome of the population de¯ned by S1
2.
Here, a modi¯ed version of this estimator is used. First, the e®ects are estimated for a popula-
tion de¯ned outside the sequences under consideration. This implies that an additional matching
step has to be performed in each comparison: The populations de¯ned by the ¯rst element of
each sequence under consideration have to be matched to the population of interest for which
the e®ects are to be estimated before matching within each of the sequences is performed. Sec-
ond, radius matching as proposed by Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2006) for static evaluation
problems rather than nearest-neighbour matching is used to increase e±ciency and potentially
robustness given that the reference population of interest is potentially large compared to the
populations de¯ned by the last element of the sequences under consideration.25
Tables 2 and 3 display the estimated e®ects of JA and TR of di®erent durations on, respec-
tively, search e®ectiveness and human capital. For each programme, the e®ects are estimated
separately for two subsamples of the reference population de¯ned by persons with a value be-
low/above the median of the respective variable of interest. The number of observation available
for the estimation in each subgroup and programme type varies between 400 and 1200 observa-
tions (see Table 4). For each comparison, less than 1% of the reference population are deleted
due a lack of common support.
Table 2: Estimated e®ects of JA of di®erent durations






Note: Di®erence in the probability to exit to employment
within 3 months (%-points). NP: nonparticipation, JAn:
completion of n half-months of JA. *E®ect is signi¯cant
on the 5% level.







Low-skilled -3.8294 0.0242 0.5960 -0.0182
High-skilled -4.4626 0.0160 -2.5502 0.0409
Note: Di®erence in
athe average daily gross wage if em-
ployed (EUR) and
bthe fraction of persons not em-
ployed (with zero average wage; %-points). NP: non-
participation, TR1: completed up to 6 months of TR,
TR2: completed more than 6 months of TR. *E®ect
is signi¯cant on the 5% level.
25 If the comparison population is small compared to the population for which the e®ects are estimated, using
more than one similar observation prevents that one particular observation gets too much weight.
48Table 4: Numbers of observations available for the estimation
Subsample
Low search e®ectiveness High search e®ectiveness
1 half-month of JA 982 878
2 half-months of JA 668 620
3 half-months of JA 598 661
4 half-months of JA 504 509
More than 4 half-months of JA 373 386
Low-skilled High-skilled
Up to 6 months of TR 1171 1002
More than 6 months of TR 809 969
E Parameters of the actual policy in West Germany 2000-2002
Figure 8: Calibration of the actual policy parameters
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Note: Averages calculated from the data for the reference population of interest. Time units are half-months.
The net wage in panel (a) is calculated assuming German income tax class 1, tax rates as of 2002,
public health insurance with rate 13.8%, no children and subject to statutory pension insurance as well
as church tax. Start of JA and TR in panel (c): time to treatment within the unemployment spell.
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